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Abstract 
Throughout the twentieth century, there have been numerous agreements towards 
commercial and financial integration of various countries and regions around the world. 
Particularly, in Europe there has been huge progress towards this direction, being 
already seventeen countries using a common currency – the Euro – under a free trade 
framework since 1993 and subject to supra-national legal environment regarding tariffs, 
barriers to entry and other forms of protective devices. 
There are several studies on the effects of stronger integration on income inequality. 
However, the conclusions that result from such analysis are not clear and, sometimes, 
they are even contradictory. 
After a revision of the main theoretical channels through which globalization may affect 
inequality as well as of the main empirical results, our study focuses on the analysis of 
the effects of integration on income inequality in ten Euro area countries, for the period 
1995-2011. Inequality is measured through three alternative indicators: Gini coefficient, 
S80/S20 income quintile share ratio and the percentage of people at risk of poverty. By 
estimating several regressions with unbalanced panel data, we concluded that 
globalization (as measured by the composite KOF index) reduces inequality in countries 
structurally more weak. Inequality significantly reacts to the economic dimension of 
globalization, namely to FDI outflows and fewer restrictions on trade and capital flows. 
In turn, political dimension KOF index seems to increase inequality in countries 
structurally stronger. Additionally, we confirm the Kuznets effect between real GDP per 
capita and inequality and that unemployment, as well as lower education, contribute to 
increase disposable income inequality. 
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Resumo 
Ao longo do século XX, verificaram-se inúmeros acordos no sentido da integração 
comercial e financeira de diversos países e regiões de todo o mundo. Particularmente, 
na Europa têm existido enormes progressos neste sentido, estando já dezassete países a 
utilizar uma moeda comum – o Euro – sob padrões de comércio livre desde 1993 e 
sujeitos a um ambiente legal supranacional no que respeita a tarifas, barreiras à entrada 
e outras formas de instrumentos de proteção. 
Há vários estudos sobre os efeitos de uma mais forte integração nas desigualdades de 
rendimentos. Contudo, as conclusões que resultam de tal análise não são claras e, por 
vezes, são mesmo contraditórias. 
Depois de uma revisão dos principais canais teóricos através dos quais a globalização 
pode afetar a desigualdade, bem como dos principais resultados empíricos, o nosso 
estudo centra-se na análise dos efeitos da integração europeia sobre a desigualdade de 
rendimentos em dez países da zona Euro, para o período de 1995 a 2011. A 
desigualdade é medida através de três indicadores alternativos: o coeficiente de Gini, o 
rácio entre os quintis de rendimentos S80/S20 e a percentagem de pessoas em risco de 
pobreza. Através da estimação de diversas regressões com dados em painel não 
balanceados, concluímos que a globalização (medida pelo índice compósito KOF) reduz 
a desigualdade nos países estruturalmente mais debilitados. A desigualdade reage 
particularmente à dimensão económica da globalização, através do investimento direto 
estrangeiro no exterior e da redução das restrições internacionais ao comércio e aos 
fluxos de capital. Por outro lado, a dimensão política do índice KOF parece influenciar 
positivamente a desigualdade nos países estruturalmente mais fortes. Adicionalmente, 
concluímos pela validação do efeito Kuznets entre PIB per capita e desigualdade e que 
a taxa de desemprego, bem como menores níveis de educação, contribuem para o 
aumento da desigualdade no rendimento disponível. 
 
 
Palavras-chave: Globalização; grau de abertura; desigualdade de rendimentos; dados 
em painel não balanceados; Europa. 
Códigos JEL: C23; F15; F63; O15.  
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 1 
Introduction 
The deep integration verified over the past few decades has been the subject of much 
research in order to apprehend its effects on both developed and developing countries. 
Indeed, trade liberalization (goods and services), free movement of people as well as 
free capital flows (all freedoms established in 1993 for the European Union (EU) 
countries even though the beginning of this process dates back to 1957 with the Treaty 
of Rome) may have a significant impact on countries development and becomes of 
increasing interest to understand their effects on welfare, i.e., how does welfare change 
as countries take part in international economic environment. One particular aspect of 
welfare assessment is related to income distribution, both within as well as between 
countries, which has evolved alongside the liberalization process. Despite all efforts 
already done to explain the impact of globalization on income distribution in several 
regions of the world, conclusions are ambiguous and even contradictory. 
The recent economic history in Europe provides a good context to evaluate the impacts 
of increasing integration on income inequality. The several treaties agreed on 
throughout the history of European Union came to provide new opportunities and 
challenges to the member states. The Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957 by Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, West Germany and Italy, created the European 
Economic Community (EEC), which established the progressive reduction of custom 
duties and proposed the creation of a customs union. In the following years several 
European countries have joined the EEC: Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 
1973, Greece in 1981, Portugal and Spain in 1986. The year of 1986 also marks the first 
major revision of the Treaty of Rome, the Single European Act (SEA). The SEA 
established a clear objective for the EEC, which was to create a single market by 31 
December 1992, characterized by a free trade area for goods and services and freedom 
of movement of the factors of production (labor and capital). A second major revision 
of the Treaty of Rome was, in 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht, which established the 
rules for the implementation of a single currency. This treaty, formally the Treaty on 
European Union, also established the European Union (EU) under its current name. The 
inception of free capital flows occurred in 1993, two years before a new EU 
enlargement to include Austria, Finland and Sweden. The last years of the XX century 
as well as the early ones of the new millennium were marked by the adoption of the 
euro in 1999 (with the exception of Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom and 
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Greece) and by the biggest EU enlargement to include countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe in 2004 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia). The last extensions took place in 2007, with the 
inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania, and in July 2013, with the membership of Croatia. 
After that, the world was hit by the financial crisis that started in the United States, due 
to the mortgage loans, in 2008. Apparently, the crisis uncovered strong external and 
public debt disequilibria, and opposed the wealthier countries against the remaining 
ones, namely on the design of multilateral supports from the former - together with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB) - to the latter 
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus). 
On the one hand, integration created new opportunities for each country to start trade 
with another member state without additional costs allowing it to achieve new markets, 
before unattainable because of costs, such as tariff barriers – an opportunity linked to 
comparative advantages. On the other hand, a country that, before liberalization, was 
producing and selling one good in which it has no comparative advantage, because it 
was protected by tariff rates, faces, after liberalization, the challenge to improve its 
productivity in order to maintain its production patterns and employment levels. In this 
context, it becomes pertinent to assess whether this growing globalizing path has 
contributed to a stronger and cooperative Europe by reducing income inequalities both 
between and within countries or if it has, instead, contributed to enlarge them.  
Recent trends in income inequality in Europe, measured by the changes in the Gini 
coefficient, evidence different performances over the last decades. OECD (2011) finds 
that, from mid-1980s to late-2000s, there are opposite paths followed by EU countries. 
Throughout this period of increasing integration, the Gini coefficient has risen, for 
example, in the Nordic countries (Sweden and Finland), United Kingdom and some 
other North and Central Europe countries, such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, 
Luxembourg or Austria. On the contrary, France, Hungary and Greece experienced a 
decrease in the Gini coefficient. To what extent are these different paths driven by 
growing integration and globalization in Europe? 
In this dissertation we intent to survey the main mechanisms through which integration 
and globalization may impinge on within-country income inequality distribution. We 
also intend to review the main empirical results in support (or not) for the theoretical 
mechanisms through which globalization transmits to income inequality. 
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Moreover, this study aims to contribute to the existing literature through testing and 
assessing how strong, and through which channels, the integration of European 
countries has shaped the distribution of disposable income within each country. Using a 
sample of ten Euro area countries and covering the period 1995 to 2011, we estimate the 
impacts of several dimensions of globalization (economic, social and political) on three 
alternative inequality measures: the Gini coefficient, the S80/S20 ratio and the 
percentage of population at risk of poverty.  
In the following section we provide a literature review of the main studies undertaken to 
date on this subject, detailing their main outcomes, sample and methodology. In section 
2 we provide a descriptive analysis on the evolution of cross-country indicators of 
globalization and income inequality for the European countries. In section 3, we 
proceed with the description of the methodology, as well as the definition of the main 
variables and data sources. Also in this section, we perform a detailed analysis of 
results. Finally, concluding remarks will be summarized in section 4. 
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1. Globalization and inequality – a literature review 
The constant process in order to liberalize commercial and financial operations around 
the world has been a subject for many analyses that aim at ascertaining its consequences 
on the distribution of incomes both across and within regions/countries.  
Globalization has several dimensions. It was formerly, and still usually is, identified 
with free trade across regions (Crafts, 2004; Kremer and Maskin, 2006; Gourdon et al., 
2008; Dobson and Ramlogan, 2009; and Hellier and Chusseau, 2010). Its measurement 
relies on trade openness or Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) indicators, such as the 
“openness degree”, the “net FDI inflow/gross fixed capital formation” ratio, “per capita 
FDI” or “FDI in percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)”. From goods and 
services (GS) liberalization, globalization was further extended to include also financial 
liberalization (Banerjee and Nag, 2011). In particular, financial integration is assessed 
through indicators such as the differentials in the returns to domestic and foreign capital 
or in the inflation rates. More recently, globalization has evolved towards a more 
comprehensive definition that goes beyond the economic dimension, also referring to 
political and social aspects (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2006; Lee, 2006; Milanovic et al., 2007; 
Wan et al., 2007; Dreher and Gaston, 2008; Barlow et al., 2009; Bergh and Nilsson, 
2010; Zhou et al., 2011, and Chordokrak and Chintrakarn, 2011). These aspects are 
captured by indicators like the number of embassies in a country, membership in 
international organizations, foreign population in percentage of total population, per 
capita internet hosts, the share of internet users in total population or the per capita 
number of McDonald’s restaurants. 
Starting at bridging the gap between ancient and present incomes and life expectancies 
inequalities, Milanovic et al. (2007) applies inequality possibility frontier and inequality 
extraction ratio measures to assess the relationship between ancient and present incomes 
and life expectancies inequalities in fourteen pre-industrial societies from 14 to 1947. 
The first measure refers to the maximum attainable income inequality (compatible with 
the grouped data from social tables and assuming that any individual from a higher 
social class is richer than any individual from a lower social class) and is related to the 
possibility, and its extent, of the landless and rural poor people of being exploited by the 
landed and richest ones, given the incomes distribution between social classes. As for 
the inequality extraction ratio refers to the actual verified income inequality in 
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proportion of its maximum attainable. Countries more unequal and facing racial 
discrimination, tribal power or regional dualism, are expected to exploit much more the 
maximum potential inequality when they are richer (sometimes through corruption), 
which becomes more likely to occur when they follow an industrialization path or by 
adopting a strategy oriented towards greater openness and integration. So, when their 
per capita gross domestic income raises, their potential inequality also increases; 
assuming a constant Gini coefficient, the inequality extraction ratio falls. This implies 
that current pre-industrial societies, which did not become richer, exhibit Gini 
coefficients close to those of the ancient pre-industrial societies. Since the authors’ 
estimates show that inequality extraction ratio is now smaller than before, they conclude 
that ancient pre-industrial societies (though their income inequality would be similar to 
the present pre-industrial societies) explored much more their maximum potential 
inequality. Thus, despite the development and globalization process observed 
throughout all these centuries, income inequalities perceived in pre-industrial societies 
have exhibited a stable path in the very long run (Milanovic et al., 2007). In addition, 
and according to the authors, the recent developments in order to cure diseases that have 
been responsible for many deaths in the past centuries, especially in African countries, 
as well as their worldwide diffusion, have strongly contributed to the convergence of 
life expectancies over the world, thereby decreasing inequalities in this domain. 
Recent historical evidence shows that further integration, fostered by deepening 
globalization, is associated with the fall in transport and communication costs which has 
made international production more concentrated in more productive regions (often 
those exhibiting comparative advantages) while leaving out of this integration process 
the less productive economies (Crafts, 2004). The post-World War II period was 
marked by a rapid and sustained economic growth up until 1971 for the developed 
countries, supported by free trade promotion, stability of exchange rates sought with the 
establishment of Bretton Woods system (U.S. dollar tied to gold and all other currencies 
of the system’s member countries pegged to the dollar), institution of the Marshall Plan 
to rebuild and modernize Western Europe and the adoption of Keynesian economics, 
essentially low nominal interest rates and low inflation to control and reduce public 
debt. However, the collapse of Bretton Woods system in the early years of 1970s, the 
oil crisis in 1973 and the stock market crash in 1973-1974 came to break the long boom, 
as it is also known. Since East Asian countries, and mainly China, also experienced a 
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notable economic growth in the last two decades of twentieth century (Wan et al., 
2007), global income inequality across countries verified, after these shocks, a small 
decline. Through a descriptive analysis, based on relevant historical publications and 
data, between 1820 and 1999, Crafts (2004) infers that trade liberalization widened 
income inequality across countries and that world income inequality peaked during the 
1970s. 
Relying on data on a composite index of globalization, the KOF index (covering both 
economic, as well as social and political dimensions of globalization), Villaverde and 
Maza (2011) concluded for the presence of relative convergence of globalization across 
countries: using a sample of 101 countries and comprising the period 1970-2005, they 
found that less globalized countries evolved at a faster rate to higher globalization 
standards. Moreover, they find evidence that globalization fosters per capita income 
growth and for convergence of income per capita across countries. Thus, given relative 
convergence of globalization and growth, the authors conclude that globalization, 
indirectly, promote income convergence. 
Besides inequality between regions and countries also within-country inequality has 
been intensively investigated in order to assess the inequality effects of globalization. 
Several mechanisms have been explored and tested in the relevant literature regarding 
the relationship between globalization and within-country inequality. In what follows, 
we will focus, in particular, on the impacts of globalization on income inequality.  
 
1.1. The Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) channel 
FDI is expected to significantly increase income inequality, not by reducing the income 
of the lower-income groups but rather by increasing the income of people in higher-
income layers. This results because FDI introduces skill-biased technology which 
increases the demand for skilled relative to non-skilled labor in the host country 
(Alderson and Nielsen, 2002; Lee, 2006; Dreher and Gaston, 2008; Gourdon et al., 
2008; Chordokrak and Chintrakarn, 2011; and Banerjee and Nag, 2011).  
Lee (2006), studying the impact of globalization on income inequality in fourteen 
European Union (EU) member states, over the period 1951-1992, estimates, using 
pooled GLS, the impact of FDI and trade (together with control variables such as the 
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demographic and employment structure, education and tax levels) on income inequality. 
Similar to Crafts (2004), Lee (2006) concludes that most of the European countries in 
the sample have passed the Kuznets inverted U-shaped curve
1
 turning point in the 1960s 
or 1970s, the period in which inequality within and across countries was highest. He 
also concludes that FDI has increased income inequality for this sample of countries. 
Along its growth path, each country looked for liberalization through trade openness 
and investment but FDI raised the relative demand for skilled labor and increased 
income inequalities within each country. However, the period in which growth was 
accompanied by increasing inequality along the Kuznets curve has stopped and now, as 
per capita GDP grows more equity can be attained and a downward trend in the 
Kuznets curve becomes visible. 
At the same time, FDI is correlated with technological advances (Baliamoune-Lutz, 
2006), and this may raise the productivity of the skilled workers faction, further 
widening the income gap relative to non-skilled. Evidence for the U.S., covering the 
period 1988-2003, is provided by Chordokrak and Chintrakarn (2011). Although they 
do not find a clear result that technology has influenced income inequality in the U.S., 
they remark that the number of employees in foreign affiliates as percentage of country 
overall employment increases income inequality. Thus, globalization through FDI 
enables an increase on the wages of the skilled workers, both through the increase in 
their relative demand and in productivity, enlarging income inequality within a country.  
Still with regard to Kuznets curve hypothesis, globalization seems, in recent years, to 
have modified the pattern conjectured by Kuznets in the 1950s: after the decline in 
inequality observed once the turning point of GDP per capita is achieved, it has been 
observed, in many cases, an inverted trend towards an increase on inequality after a 
certain level of industrial development is reached – “the great U-turn” from the 
Alderson and Nielsen (2002)’s study. Such behavior might be explained, instead, by 
FDI outflows. FDI outflows appear to shift labor resources (workers) from the industrial 
sector to the services sector, which entails a pronounced change on average wages 
levels, as services sector is typically cheaper (in terms of labor costs) than industry, as 
well as a modification on the income distribution, whereas the industrial sector exhibits 
a smoother one comparatively to that of the services sector (Alderson and Nielsen, 
                                               
1
  According to Kuznets hypothesis, a country experiences an increase in inequality until a certain level of 
income is reached (turning point) after which inequality is expected to decrease (Kuznets, 1955). 
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2002); thus, FDI outflows induce a raise in income inequality. Furthermore, it may 
strengthen multinational firms’ ability to reduce wages, taking into account the 
enlargement of the labor supply due to internationalization. Yet, given that FDI 
outflows move capital abroad, labor becomes less productive than capital and wages 
decrease. Additionally, since FDI outflows typically tend to re-allocate low-skilled tasks 
to countries with lower labor costs, domestic demand for low-skilled workers is reduced 
and wage inequality rises. Performing a study encompassing sixteen OECD countries 
for the period 1967-1992, Alderson and Nielsen (2002) show, accordingly, evidence for 
an inverted trend in the Kuznets’ inverted U-shaped curve. This argument mostly 
applies to high-income (high-developed) countries that apply savings to reallocate 
production at the bottom of the value added chain. 
Focusing on an alternative independent variable, on income net of taxes and 
contributions and including all types of income redistribution, i.e., disposable income, 
Mahler (2004) finds out, for fourteen developed countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
the United Kingdom and the United States), between 1980 and 2000, no evidence of 
that FDI outflows through their effects on labor markets, as described above, influence 
income distribution. He bases his study on Luxembourg Income Study data on 
inequality to obtain a strong measure and comparability of earnings and disposable 
income. 
 
1.2. The degree of Openness channel  
As trade helps countries to improve their methods and productivity, inequality between 
countries is expected to decrease with the degree of openness. So, when countries 
expand the labor-intensive agricultural sector to increase employment levels (due to 
pressures from trade openness), tend to invest in human capital (to become more 
competitive) and their governments engage in redistributive measures (not being 
corrupt), they are on an equality-enhancing path. Nevertheless, greater openness 
exposes countries to higher inflation, due to price liberalization whereby governments 
enforce price deregulation and subsidy reduction policies (Dobson and Ramlogan, 2009; 
Barlow et al., 2009), and that may affect real wages. It also seems that higher openness 
of low-income developing countries has shifted the comparative advantage of middle-
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income countries in Latin America from low-skill labor intensity goods towards those 
with intermediate-skill labor intensity (Dobson and Ramlogan, 2009). This occurred 
when low-income Asian countries entered in the international markets, during the 
1980s, which allowed those countries to expand their exports in goods with low-skill 
intensity when Latin American countries were experiencing greater openness (Wood, 
1997). 
Using a sample of twenty transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, from 1990 to 2004, Barlow et al. (2009) found 
that, with price liberalization, and privatization self-employment and entrepreneurial 
activity, incomes can be higher, though only for those which have monetary means to 
ensure their access to the assets market. Moreover, inflation increases because wage 
rates are correlated to productivity and higher skill premium, and the private sector 
magnifies the impacts of liberalization on prices, as price regulation and subsidies are 
reduced. This erodes real wages, harming relatively more the poorer (as also indicated 
by Dobson and Ramlogan, 2009). Thus, inequality is higher the higher is liberalization 
and globalization as they negatively (positively) affect low-income (wealthier) 
individuals. For a sample with eighteen Latin American countries, covering the period 
1982-2000, Dobson and Ramlogan (2009) test for a Kuznets curve between inequality 
and trade openness, given that these concepts have been associated in the literature and 
their link has been object of many studies. They find a curvilinear relationship between 
trade liberalization and income inequality in Latin America, wherein income inequality 
increases until a certain level of openness is reached and after which it begins to fall. 
Furthermore, the increased integration of national economies in world markets, through 
liberalization of trade and finance, can also affect gender inequality within countries. 
Since women in less developed countries work mainly in the agricultural sector, they 
are likely to benefit less from the positive effects of higher trade openness in their 
countries, because the increase in competitiveness in industry and the consequent 
reduction on the “employers’ ability to discriminate against women in concentrated 
industries” (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2006: page 302 referring Becker, 1957). Being 
especially small farmers, they cannot take advantage of new markets because they 
cannot access to credit, new technologies or market know-how. Baliamoune-Lutz 
(2006) explores whether globalization and growth affect gender inequality in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) countries and if that effect differs from that in other developing 
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countries. The study relies on a sample with thirty SSA countries and thirty two non-
SSA developing countries, for the period 1990-1999. The author bases the gender 
inequality on unequal access to skills and competencies and concludes that higher 
openness and growth have a positive effect on gender inequality in SSA countries while 
in the non-SSA they appear non-significant. Thus, SSA countries seem to evidence a 
higher gender inequality in access to education amongst the labor force, since women 
continue to be discriminated among employees and the higher demand for unskilled 
labor (allowed by the higher trade openness) is not achieved by them. So, they remain 
small farmers (most of them) and female literacy rates remain low. 
However, liberalization in developing countries is often linked to agricultural trade 
liberalization and this allows “farmers to take advantage of higher world prices” 
(Banerjee and Nag, 2011: page 585). Thus, the wage rate of unskilled workers rises, 
“whereas rent on domestic capital and foreign capital remains unchanged” (Banerjee 
and Nag, 2011: page 585). Also, the volume of skilled employment (and the respective 
production) is not affected. In this case, the wage gap between skilled and unskilled 
workers is expected to decrease (Banerjee and Nag, 2011). However, this mechanism, 
based on agricultural trade liberalization, lacks empirical evidence.  
Barlow et al. (2009) argue that since globalization exposes countries to a more 
competitive market, considering jointly price liberalization, privatization and trade 
openness (the latter mainly through exports) it is observed that employers distribute the 
gains associated to exports more evenly between owners and workers (as a consequence 
of the competition between employers for the attempt to enlist the workers who are 
more skilled – efficiency-wage argument), thus reducing inequality.  
However, opposite effects can also occur. Andersen and SØrensen (2011) argue that 
when the process of product market integration begins and protection rents (barriers to 
entry) are increasingly eliminated, increased competitiveness pressures wage inequality 
down, promoting more efficiency and lower income inequality within country; but, in a 
more advanced stage of integration, it favors specialized rents (obtained through 
comparative advantages) and less competitive firms are driven out of the market. This 
latter effect occurs because, when trade frictions are already small, lower prices remain 
amongst the non-tradable products and wages must fall because of take-overs threat 
from foreign firms – in de-regulated markets, it is easier for foreign firms to penetrate 
into the domestic market and acquire a market share. In turn, the higher productivity of 
 11 
export-oriented firms allows greater profits and higher wages and, thus, the wage gap 
between skilled and unskilled labor increases. Since, initially, income convergence is 
attained (by the reduction of protection rents) and as integration becomes deeper higher 
incomes are achievable, the relation between product market integration and inequality 
is U-shaped. It is worth to note that Andersen and SØrensen (2011) reach these 
outcomes under several assumptions, such as Bertrand competition, constant returns to 
scale, perfect substitutes, log normally distributed productivity, and modeling two 
countries each with two parts – the home part (perfectly competitive, not directly 
affected by product market integration and commodity is not traded) and the globalized 
part (directly affected by product market integration) - , but no empirical evidence is 
provided for validation of these mechanisms.  
Linked with this product market integration is the phenomenon of migration. Usually, 
immigrant labor force in the relatively richer countries is “characterized by low average 
skills and high skills variance” (Alderson and Nielsen, 2002: page 1256). This 
movement may, thus, threaten the unskilled workers wages’ stability in the host 
countries, as it exerts an influence towards wage reduction through the increase in labor 
supply and the reduction in average skills; immigration also introduces a higher 
heterogeneity of skills on these countries, contributing to increase inequality. On the 
contrary, the poor countries, exporters of low-skilled labor force, experience a decline in 
inequality due to a reduced pressure from labor supply. Evidence of such impacts is 
found, mainly during the 1980s, by Alderson and Nielsen (2002), when studying the 
effects of mass-migration in OECD countries. 
 
1.3. The role of initial endowments 
Besides the impacts resulting from trade liberalization and changes in FDI, country 
endowments may also play a major role on income inequalities within countries 
(Gourdon et al., 2008). On the one hand, the less developed countries are, in most cases, 
endowed with a large fraction of low-educated labor force, i.e., workers without 
complete primary or elementary education. Thus, they are expected to remain confined 
to non-tradable activities and low wages while the few highly skilled workers in these 
countries see their wages increase as globalization proceeds, which entails an inequality 
increase. On the other hand, countries endowed with a larger share of skilled labor, 
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often more developed countries, exhibit a large portion of land and capital concentrated 
in few people. Since their rents tend also to increase with trade liberalization, by the 
increase of their demand as a result of accentuated levels of FDI, only the richest 
increase their incomes and thus income inequality also increases. Gourdon et al. (2008) 
find these results through a fixed effects model in order to reduce the need to explain 
differences resulting from omitted variables, for a sample with sixty one countries, 
including nations from all continents, for the period 1980 to 2000. 
In theory, a country is able to increase its production share through trade openness – 
because it enables capturing the production of new goods over time, globalization 
displaces the frontier of production between countries (Hellier and Chusseau, 2010) and 
cross-border production easily occurs. Thus, globalization enables foreign workers to 
join national workers in the same firm (Kremer and Maskin, 2006). While a country 
increases its production share, assuming constant technologies and, thus, worldwide 
global production, the other countries have to adjust themselves to a reduced production 
share through three possible ways (Hellier and Chusseau, 2010). The first consists in an 
increase of the skill premium (factor prices), which will be higher in inequality-biased 
countries because they have to do a stronger effort to enhance their skills in order to 
ascend in the scale of skill intensities and to move to specialization, to ensure full 
employment while maintaining their endowments in skilled and unskilled employment 
constant. Thus, countries relatively more unskilled, more unequal too, as they have cost 
advantages in low-skilled goods, their skill premium is higher than that in skilled 
countries – this is derived by the authors using a theoretical model. More unequal 
countries will experience an (higher than other countries) increase in inequality from 
globalization. A second way to adjust is based on the acceptance of substantial 
unemployment of unskilled workers, while abdicating of the skill premium so as to 
prevent the rise in inequality. In fact, the move to specialization consists in ascending in 
the scale of skill intensities and when a country captures a production share of another it 
captures the production of its lowest-skilled intensity goods. The last option, revealed 
by Hellier and Chusseau (2010)’s model, is related with the increase of the relative skill 
endowment which will be higher the lower the initial skill level is because of the 
specialization scale already referred. Hence, initially inequality-biased countries will get 
even more unequal. There is an inequality-unemployment trade-off. However, in 
countries initially more egalitarian, i.e., that display higher levels of redistribution and 
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social intervention before the onset of globalization (as in the case of Scandinavian 
countries), a small increase in its relative skill endowment will be enough to adjust to 
globalization without increase neither unemployment nor skill premium. Thus, these 
countries face a lower inequality-unemployment trade-off than inequality-biased 
countries. 
Thereby, through the development of their model and under the assumptions of a 
continuum of goods, no technical progress, skilled and unskilled labor as the only 
inputs, a high-skilled labor market competitive, i.e., it is at full employment and that 
unskilled labor wage is determined by a minimum wage or a centralized bargaining, 
Hellier and Chusseau (2010) find that globalization constraints in terms of inequality-
unemployment trade-off differ across countries and depend on their initial endowments. 
Both these results and those from Gourdon et al. (2008) emphasize initial endowments 
as relevant for the impacts of globalization on within-country income inequality. 
 
1.4. Political and social dimensions of globalization 
With the deepening of globalization and countries’ possibility to homogenize their 
internal policies, it is to expect that social aspects (for instance, the increase in 
international tourism, travel or technological connection by internet) are not of 
widespread benefits accruing to unskilled workers in developing countries, negatively 
affecting inequality; additionally, a large government makes more public consumption 
and transfers than a smaller one, reducing inequality (Bergh and Nilsson, 2010). 
Likewise, we can think in government policies in democratic states that can be more 
market-oriented policies rather than towards redistributive targets – a shift towards the 
former may increase inequality (Dreher and Gaston, 2008). In turn, privatization, 
boosted by the reduction of government intervention on economy and the adoption of 
market-oriented policies, has a positive impact on income inequality, because the search 
for efficiency and profit maximization will redirect the labor supply for skilled workers 
(in substitution of the less skilled), increasing their wages and market prices relative to 
the other groups (Dobson and Ramlogan, 2009). 
Villaverde and Maza (2011), using data for 101 countries taken from the KOF website, 
conclude that dispersion in total and economic globalization indexes remained rather 
stable up until mid-1980s while afterwards (and up to 2005) it fell steady. As for social 
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globalization, disparities across countries have increased and, after a sudden fall, in 
1991, have remained fairly stable. In regards to political globalization, dispersion fell 
strongly during the 1970s and remained stable afterwards. Still, the social and political 
globalization dimensions appear with more scattered indicators across countries, 
revealing a higher disparity between them than that observed for the economic 
dimension of globalization. Furthermore, and besides the relative convergence in the 
total globalization index, Villaverde and Maza (2011) also find similar evidence for the 
three sub-indexes: in particular, they find higher speed of convergence of the political 
measure. 
Collecting several results from many studies, Clark et al. (2011) find that FDI entails an 
increase in income inequality. However, it may reduce poverty if its highest flows 
associated with globalization were accompanied by an active action by governments 
proceeding redistribution measures and searching highest competitive markets both 
through transfers or subsidies and labor market policies. Alike, Nissanke and Thorbecke 
(2006) find, in this debate about globalization and poverty, an important role taken by 
governments in order to do not accept passively the globalization process and the 
importance to undertake policies “to strengthen institutions of social protection”.  
Considering and understanding, likewise, that globalization goes beyond economic 
aspects, Gunter and Hoeven (2004) gather results from numerous studies to conclude 
for a consensus that indicate the need for a more active role of the national governments 
in order to provide public goods and social protection to reduce risks and uncertainty, 
resulting from the greater international volatility brought to trade, investment and 
production, that affect markets and people.  
Thus, and following the development of globalization concept, it is worth considering, 
additionally, how political and social aspects of globalization impinge on income 
distribution. These aspects of globalization are usually captured by composite indexes 
such as the KOF Globalization Index, the Economic Freedom of the World Index 
(EFW), the Maastricht Globalization Index (MGI) or the Kearney Globalization Index 
(KGI).  
According to Marginean and Orastean (2011), the first composite index of globalization 
was introduced by Dreher, in 2002, in an attempt to merge economic, social and 
political dimensions of globalization. The author uses three sub-indexes to include data 
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on economic integration, on political engagement and on social globalization (Dreher, 
2006), using several indicators, and their respective weights in each sub-index, as 
described in Table A.1 in Annex A.  
EFW is an index regularly published by the Fraser Institute, since 1974, and it measures 
contribution of policies and institutions to economic freedom (Stein and Tommasi, 
2007). It includes indicators on the size of government, legal system and property 
rights, sound money, freedom to trade internationally and regulation as major areas 
which are subdivided as detailed on Table A.2 in Annex A.  
The MGI was developed by Martens and Zywietz (2006), and Martens and Raza (2009) 
(cited by Dreher et al., 2010: page 167) to measure economic, political, social and 
cultural, technological and ecological dimensions of globalization. Each category is also 
decomposed in several variables which are shown in Table A.3 in Annex A.  
Finally, the KGI, was proposed by the consulting firm A.T. Kearney, Inc. to assess 
economic integration, personal contact, technological connectivity and political 
engagement (Zhou et al., 2011) and it results from a weighted average of various 
variables included in the indexes already presented (see Table A.4 in Annex A for more 
detail).  
Berg and Nilsson (2010) use the KOF and EFW indexes to measure globalization and to 
assess how the different dimensions are able to influence income distribution. They use 
data for seventy nine countries from all continents between 1970 and 2005, and found 
that within-country inequality increases, mainly in developed countries, when trade is 
liberalized and deregulated. Furthermore, they conclude that social globalization, 
related to technological services and interaction among countries taking part on the 
integration process, is practically unachievable by unskilled workers in developing 
countries, raising inequality in those economies; moreover, they found evidence for that 
a smaller government tends to increase inequality in developed countries as they tend 
neither to enforce redistributive measures nor to make public consumption expenditure 
as much as larger governments do. Dreher and Gaston (2008) use the KOF index to 
address the impact of globalization on industrial wage and household income inequality 
of developed and developing countries. By using a sample encompassing twenty seven 
OECD countries and seventy four non-OECD countries from all regions of the world, 
over a similar period, 1970-2000, they observe that an increase in democracy has led to 
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market-oriented reforms that made inequality increase in the OECD countries while no 
robust evidence of that is found in the less-developed economies. In a similar study, 
results in Zhou et al. (2011) provide no evidence that social and political factors have 
contributed to increase income within-country inequality, using a sample with sixty 
countries in the Kearney database (2002, 2003 and 2004 as appointed by the authors) 
and covering the period 1950-2001. On the contrary, the estimates reveal that higher 
levels for travel and tourism (as measured by “(Tourist arrivals + Tourist 
departures)/Population ratio)” and internet users (in percentage of total population) are 
able to negatively influence the Gini coefficient within each country. 
Another assessment of inequality relies on the analysis of regional income inequalities 
within a country. This is likely to occur with higher frequency in large countries in 
which there are several regions more developed than others and more able to access and 
exploit resources. Regions near from seaports and trading with other developed regions 
or countries have the ability to attract more FDI and capital and develop their regional 
economy. The remarkable growth of China in the two last decades of twentieth century 
due to export deregulation and the abolishment of tariffs, licenses and quotas to imports 
that have promoted a significant increase in its international trade, provides a good 
example. According to Wan et al. (2007), since China’s internationalization process has 
been transversal to all regions, urbanization has followed a convergence trend across 
China, which contributes to decrease regional income inequality. This effect was 
reinforced by the development of transports and communication networks, by the public 
provision of basic education and by a policy of birth control implemented by China´s 
governments. However, given that east China is more developed than central and west, 
it is likely to attract “much more FDI and trade” and capital than the other regions 
(Wan et al., 2007: page 39). East China is able to better exploit benefits from trade 
(trading with other developed regions), and its spillovers, and it is better endowed with 
resources. Because of that, also privatizations are more likely to occur in this region. 
Thus, different regions have different paces of globalization and these last variables, 
location and privatization, contribute to accentuate their income inequalities (between 
regions). Through an analysis over the period 1987-2001 for twenty nine regions of 
China, Wan et al. (2007) conclude for a positive and increasing contribution of trade, 
domestic capital and privatization to increase regional inequality. The FDI inflows have 
also contributed to increase regional inequality, but at a slower path. Relative 
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contribution of government support has remained stable along this period, while the 
effects of the other variables on regional inequality, such as dependency ratio, 
education, location and urbanization have decreased, as related above. 
  
 18 
2. Uncovering the relationship between globalization and 
inequality in the Euro area – a tentative analysis 
In this section we present a brief descriptive analysis on the evolution of cross-country 
indicators of globalization and income inequality for the Euro area countries. Because 
some actual members of the Euro area have just recently joined it (Slovenia in 2007, 
Cyprus and Malta in 2008, Slovakia in 2009, Estonia in 2011), and their integration 
processes are not as consolidated as those for the remaining countries, they are not 
addressed in this study. Due to data restrictions we also exclude Greece, which joined in 
2001, in order not to bias our outcomes. So, the group of countries covered in this study 
encompasses those countries which joined to Euro area in 1999: Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain. 
Relying on the vast existing literature, one can define some globalization and income 
inequality indicators. Among the former, we devote our attention to the openness 
degree, the FDI and the KOF index of globalization already outlined in the previous 
section, while in the case of the latter we focus on the income Gini coefficient
2
, the 
S80/S20 income quintile ratio and the percentage of total population at risk of poverty 
after social transfers.
3
 All of data for these variables were extracted from Eurostat
4
, with 
the exception of the data for KOF index of globalization, whose data were obtained at 
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/ in May 2013. 
Figure 1 shows the relation between the Gini coefficient and the openness degree (as 
measured by the sum of exports and imports in percentage of GDP). In line with the 
results and conclusions obtained in former research - an ambiguous and even 
                                               
2
 Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income - as described by the Eurostat, the total disposable 
household income is equivalised “to take into account the impact of differences in household size and 
composition” (at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/EN/ilc_esms.htm, accessed in 
February 2013). “The equivalised income attributed to each member of the household is calculated by 
dividing the total disposable income of the household by the equivalisation factor. Equivalisation factors 
can be determined in various ways. Eurostat applies an equivalisation factor calculated according to the 
OECD-modified scale first proposed in 1994 - which gives a weight of 1.0 to the first person aged 14 or 
more, a weight of 0.5 to other persons aged 14 or more and a weight of 0.3 to persons aged 0-13” (as 
defined by Eurostat at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/EN/ilc_esms.htm accessed in 
February 2013). 
3
 Eurostat sets that the “persons are at risk of poverty if their equivalised disposable income is below the 
risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income after 
social transfers” (at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/EN/t2020_52_esmsip.htm, 
accessed in February 2013). 
4
 At http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes. 
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contradictory relationship between the two variables -, we find, for the period 1995-
2011, a slight negative relationship between average Gini coefficient and average 
openness degree. 
Figure 1: Openness degree and Gini coefficient, average values 1995-2011 
 
Data Source: Own calculation based on data from Eurostat, accessed in February 2013 at    
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes 
 
The average level of the openness degree varies between 48.29 and 256.28 of GDP, for 
Italy and Luxembourg, respectively. However, the latter is clearly an outsider because 
of its narrow borders and where most of the workforce is composed by foreign workers. 
Even if Luxembourg is left out of the sample, the linear trend drawn in Figure 1 would 
assume the same shape. Curiously, or not, the countries that arise at the top of the trend 
and facing highest inequality are Italy (average Gini coefficient equals 31.39), Ireland 
(31.54), Portugal (36.3) and Spain (32.56), which are those most affected by the recent 
economical and financial crisis and belong, together with Greece, to the well-known 
GIIPS – Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (IIPS henceforward). 
The inclusion of Luxembourg in the sample does not produce qualitative changes in the 
slope of the linear trend drawn in the figure, but affects it quantitatively. That is, despite 
its higher average level of openness degree, Luxembourg exhibits an ordinary average 
level of Gini coefficient, which biases the trend for countries when considering only 
countries with more comparable indicators. Furthermore, as we have already seen in 
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section 1, most globalization mechanisms operate through labor market. Since this 
market is largely composed, in Luxembourg, by foreign workers and that our inequality 
measures are applied to resident population, our inequality outcomes would be biased 
by this labor market particular feature. Therefore, we will proceed without Luxembourg 
in the analysis. Thus, Figure 2 shows the same trend as that in Figure 1 but it does not 
comprise Luxembourg. 
Figure 2: Openness degree and Gini coefficient, average values 1995-2011 
(excluding Luxembourg) 
  
Data Source: Own calculation based on data from Eurostat, accessed in February 2013 at    
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes 
 
The same, rather weak, relationship is observed when other inequality indicators are 
used: the S80/S20 income ratio and the percentage of total population at risk of poverty. 
Figure 3 reflects the reduction in average S80/S20 income quintile share ratio, which 
represents a reduction in inequality between these opposite heights for larger openness 
degrees. The same trend is observed for the average percentage of total population at 
risk of poverty, as shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 3: Openness degree and S80/S20 income quintile ratio, average values 1995-
2011 
 
Data Source: Own calculation based on data from Eurostat, accessed in February 2013 at    
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes 
 
Figure 4: Openness degree and the percentage of population at risk of poverty, 
average values 1995-2011 
 
Data Source: Own calculation based on data from Eurostat, accessed in February 2013 at    
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes 
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It should be added that the group of countries already found above the linear trend 
drawn in each figure above (IIPS) keeps its position irrespectively of the inequality 
measure in use. Thus, the country with the highest level of S80/S20 ratio is Portugal 
with a ratio of 6.60 as opposed to Finland, with a ratio of 3.50. This means that, e.g., the 
richest 20% of Portuguese population is 6.60 times richer than the poorest 20%. In 
regard to the percentage of total population at risk of poverty, we observe, again, 
Portugal at the top (19.81%) and, at the bottom the Netherlands (10.78%); the latter is 
one of the Euro area countries where social transfers represent the largest share of GDP 
(see Eurostat database). 
Apart from openness degree, we are also interested in ascertaining the impact of FDI on 
income inequality. Analysis of Figure 5 shows a negative correlation between the 
average net FDI inflows (investment less disinvestment in the host country) and average 
Gini coefficient. 
Figure 5: FDI inflows and Gini coefficient, average values 1995-2011 
 
Data Source: Own calculation based on data from Eurostat, accessed in February 2013 at    
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes 
 
Not only relatively to Gini coefficient but also concerning to average S80/S20 
inequality measure (the latter is shown in Figure 6 below) it is also perceived a linear 
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inequality in the set of countries under review, inequality exhibits an upward trend 
when the average levels of openness degree and FDI inflows expand. It is worth to note 
that this aspect was already seen in the previous figure related with this inequality 
indicator (S80/S20) and that Belgium, which appears usually on border of the linear 
trend line, follows up this countries’ upward trend. 
Apparently, a negative relationship between inequality and globalization is stronger for 
high inequality countries while it is rather weak, even positive, for low levels of 
inequality. 
Figure 6: FDI inflows and S80/S20 income quintile ratio, average values 1995-2011 
 
Data Source: Own calculation based on data from Eurostat, accessed in February 2013 at    
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes 
 
Figure 7 reveals an extreme disparity between the IIPS and all other countries as regards 
to percentage of total population at risk of poverty. Ireland, which is the country from 
IIPS with the lowest percentage (18.63%), exhibits a level which is four percentage 
points greater than the country with the highest one from all other countries, Belgium, 
with 14.48% of people at risk of poverty. In this case, we observe a downward trend 
between this inequality indicator and FDI inflows in both groups of countries, clearly 
stronger for the low inequality countries. This feature is also common to the relationship 
between risk of poverty and openness degree. 
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Figure 7: FDI inflows and the percentage of population at risk of poverty, average 
values 1995-2011 
 
Data Source: Own calculation based on data from Eurostat, accessed in February 2013 at    
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes 
 
The above regularities found regarding inequality measures and openness and FDI 
inflows are also valid when the relationship is assessed using average FDI outflows and 
the average KOF index of globalization. Figures B.1, B.2 and B.3, and C.1, C.2 and C.3 
in Annexes B and C, respectively, (each one covering for Gini, S80/20 and risk of 
poverty indicators) show that, not only FDI outflows but also the KOF index, on 
average, relate negatively with Gini and S80/S20 inequality measures when inequality 
is high while exhibiting a positive relationship for low inequality levels. Using the risk 
of poverty indicator, the relationship is apparently negative for both groups of countries 
but, as before, relatively weaker when inequality is higher. Since we have already seen 
the inequality standards of each country, it must be only noted that the countries with 
the highest average FDI outflows in percentage of GDP are plainly the Netherlands 
(9.12%) and Belgium (13.59%). The others show a percentage between 1.56% (Italy) 
and 5.60% (Ireland). This ranking almost is maintained when we observe the results for 
the average KOF index. The exception is the replacement of Ireland by Austria. In this 
case, the Netherlands exhibits an average index of 90.43 and Belgium of 92.01. The gap 
for the other countries is now much smaller, being that the average KOF index for 
Austria is 88.92 and 80.18 for Italy.  
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3. Assessment of the relationship between globalization and 
inequality in the Euro area – a panel data approach 
3.1. Methodology and data 
The analysis presented in the previous section is rather inconclusive of the relationship 
governing globalization and inequality. Tentative analysis show that either negative or 
positive relationships may arise when inequality is measured through the Gini index or 
the S80/S20 ratio; apparently, a negative relationship arises between globalization and 
risk of poverty. However, several determinants, namely growth or the role of social 
transfers, affect inequality to a large extent, factors that the analysis in section 2 fails to 
address. 
In this context we proceed with an econometric study in order to properly address the 
impact of globalization on inequality, controlling for other main determinants. In what 
follows we proceed with the description of the methodology as well as of the chosen 
variables to explain inequality. We also provide the main motivation, descriptive 
statistics and the data sources for each variable of the model.  
In an attempt to test and to assess how globalization experience of the countries 
engaged in European integration has shaped the distribution of income/wealth within 
each country, we collected some of the more relevant studies on world inequality and 
we have examined the most important mechanisms, which have already been addressed 
in section 1. Gini coefficient on income is probably the most widely used indicator on 
inequality changes. Besides globalization variables, either capturing its economic, social 
or political dimensions, several other variables are commonly used in the literature as 
determinants of inequality (control variables). We collected several empirical studies 
encompassing all these aspects: Dreher and Gaston (2008), covering for more than one 
hundred countries and for the period 1970-2000; Bergh and Nilsson (2010), with a 
sample of seventy-nine countries and data from 1970 to 2005; and Villaverde and Maza 
(2011), including one hundred and one countries for time period 1970-2005. All of them 
test whether KOF index of globalization influences income inequality through 
unbalanced panel data applications. As already referred in section 1, above, KOF is a 
composite index which covers three dimensions of globalization (economic, social and 
political) using a wide range of variables, such as shown in Table A.1 in Annex A. 
Other studies simply rely on the economic dimension of globalization, namely through 
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the use of variables such as the openness degree or its components - exports and imports 
- (e.g., Baliamoune-Lutz, 2006, Dobson and Ramlogan, 2009), or the FDI (e.g., Mahler, 
2004 uses FDI-outflows) or both (e.g., Lee, 2006, Wan et al., 2007, Barlow et al., 2009) 
to explain inequalities; these variables are included in the economic dimension of the 
KOF index. 
Relatively to the most used control variables, we briefly summarize the main motivation 
drawn from the literature as to include them as determinants of inequality.  
We introduce real GDP per capita and its square for the same reason that, e.g., Dreher 
and Gaston (2008), that is, to ascertain whether Kuznets curve effect is present at the 
level of real GDP per capita and inequality. In this regard, we expect that inequality 
rises until certain levels of real GDP per capita are reached, after which inequality will 
tend to decrease. 
Like Bergh and Nilsson (2010), we also include unemployment rate to assess whether 
higher unemployment rates affect positively and significantly income inequality. 
We also consider an education variable alike several studies in literature (e.g., Gourdon 
et al., 2008, Bergh and Nilsson, 2010, Zhou et al., 2011). Our control variable consists 
on the percentage of people with twenty-five years or over with only basic education. 
With its inclusion we expect larger values to be associated with higher inequality, 
because people with low educational attainment levels tend to earn lower wages, which 
may entail an increase in inequality. 
Again following Dreher and Gaston (2008), we use a variable that collects all 
government social transfers. It is expected that transfers contribute to reduce inequality 
as they are targeted to smooth the impacts on disposable income of the poorer (e.g., 
unemployed or low-income households). 
As referred by Faustino and Vali (2011), tax revenues, measured in percentage of GDP, 
may affect income distribution. We subdivide taxes into taxes on consumption (indirect) 
and labor and capital (direct) and we try to capture the importance of the weight of the 
direct taxes on total taxes to explain income inequality. We expect this ratio may to 
decrease inequality because taxes on labor charge workers at progressive rates, that is, 
they charge increasingly higher wages; and taxes on capital charge, mainly, the richest, 
who are capital owners, and, then, they contribute to reduce wealth and the associated 
incomes. 
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For our empirical purpose, we propose to adopt a general panel data model, using a 
sample that includes the 10 Euro area countries used in section 2 and covering the 
period from 1995 to 2011.
5
 Model general specification is as follows (Gujarati, 2004: 
page 656): 
 
                          
                                       . (3.1) 
 
Vector   encompasses the dependent variable capturing inequality. For robustness 
purposes and to distinguish between different dimensions of inequality, we include, 
alternatively, three indicators of rather widespread use: the Gini coefficient on 
disposable income, the disposable income S80/S20 ratio and the percentage of 
population at risk of poverty. We want to test whether the same variables, namely those 
capturing globalization, affect inequality differently depending on the dimension under 
study.  
Constant terms are gathered in matrix   (as we will see below, it includes only fixed 
cross-section effects);   and   are vectors of the parameters to be estimated; the lagged 
variable is included since inequality relative patterns do not reflect large variations over 
time across regional groups of countries (e.g., Gourdon et al., 2008: page 348);   is the 
error terms vector and   includes the independent variables of regular use in the 
literature on inequality (control variables), as well as other capturing globalization: 
 Openness degree in percentage of GDP is defined as the sum of exports and imports 
of goods and services in percentage of the country’s GDP; 
 FDI – inflows are the total net investment inflows, i.e., investment minus 
disinvestment in the country made by third countries, in percentage of GDP; 
 FDI – outflows are the total net investment outflows, i.e., investment minus 
disinvestment abroad, in percentage of GDP; 
 KOF Globalization index and its sub indexes, as described in Table A.1 in Annex 
A; 
                                               
5
 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
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 Real GDP per capita is measured in Euro per inhabitant; 
 Unemployment rate consists on annual average rate; 
 Lower education refers to the percentage of people with twenty-five years or over 
with lower secondary education attainment. This education level is considered by 
Eurostat the stage “to complete the provision of basic education”, at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/EN/edat_esms.htm; 
 Social protection benefits includes all government transfers, in percentage of GDP, 
to insurance against any kind of social exclusion, for example sickness, health care, 
disability, old age or unemployment; 
 Taxes structure, or the weight of direct taxes on total taxes charged, in 
percentage of GDP; 
KOF index and its decomposition data was extracted from the website 
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/ in May 2013 (last data update). All data for the other 
variables, including that for inequality measures, was extracted from the Eurostat 
website at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes, accessed 
in February-March 2013. 
The model ends up as an unbalanced panel, since data on all variables is not available 
for all countries or for all years under in the sample (see Annex D). Since our cross-
section units are not random drawings from a larger sample (our sample covers 10 out 
of the current 17 members of the Euro area), the fixed effects model seems more 
adequate than the random effects model (Gujarati, 2004: page 650). However, and to 
better sustain the choice for a fixed-effects model, we use the built-in tools available in 
the statistical software Eviews, and we first proceed with the Hausman test to check for 
the presence of fixed against random effects (Gujarati, 2004: page 651). Then, we also 
test the joint significance of the fixed effects, cross-section or/and period effects. Table 
1 and Table 2, below, report the corresponding tests for a particular specification 
(specification in Table 3, in section 3.2, below). 
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The results on the Hausman test
6
, in Table 1, strongly reject the null hypothesis that 
individual effects are uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables. Thus, the test 
points to the option for a fixed-effects model.  
 
Table 1: Hausman test 
Gini income coefficient S80/S20 ratio Risk of poverty 
Hausman 
Test 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic 
Chi-
Sq. 
d.f. 
Prob. 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic 
Chi-
Sq. 
d.f. 
Prob. 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic 
Chi-
Sq. 
d.f. 
Prob. 
Cross-
section 
random 
29.327085 9 0.0006 49.586687 9 0.0000 20.289677 9 0.0162 
 
Moreover, the results shown in Table 2, below, also go for the option to reject the null 
hypothesis according to which cross-section effects are redundant (p-values below 0.10) 
together with the option of not rejecting the hypothesis of redundant period effects (both 
p-values are above 0.10). When cross-section and period effects are considered jointly, 
they often appear significant but this outcome is strongly biased by the notorious 
individual cross-section significance. Therefore, we will estimate our model considering 
only cross-section fixed effects. 
 
                                               
6
 We just apply Hausman test for baseline model because we cannot enforce it for the other regressions. 
With Swamy-Arora correction we cannot apply the test because our number of regressors is greater than 
the number of cross-sections. With the other two corrections (Wallace-Hussain and Wansbeek-Kapteyn), 
software Eviews finds an invalid test. 
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Table 2: Test for cross-section and period fixed effects 
Gini income coefficient S80/S20 ratio Risk of poverty 
Redundant Fixed 
Effects Tests 
Statistic d.f. Prob. Statistic d.f. Prob. Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section 
F 
2.359498 (9,96) 0.0188 4.009319 (9,99) 0.0002 1.696497 (9,99) 0.0998 
Cross-section 
Chi-square 
25.778899 9 0.0022 41.022433 9 0.0000 18.932869 9 0.0258 
Period F 0.916250 (14,96) 0.5443 0.493517 (14,99) 0.9317 0.913154 (14,99) 0.5474 
Period F Chi-
square 
16.178647 14 0.3026 8.905060 14 0.8371 16.031404 14 0.3115 
Cross-
section/Period 
F 
1.819217 (23,96) 0.0234 2.321059 (23,99) 0.0023 1.428501 (23,99) 0.1167 
Cross-
section/Period 
Chi-square 
46.667014 23 0.0025 56.929763 23 0.0001 37.829483 23 0.0266 
 
Alongside these tests we have also computed the correlations between explanatory 
variables (see Table E.1, in Annex).  
Since the KOF index captures several dimensions of globalization (economic, social 
and political), we start with a base model in which the composite KOF index is used as 
a proxy for globalization. We then proceed to control for the disentangled effects of the 
different dimensions of the globalization on inequality, with special attention devoted to 
the economic dimension - openness degree, FDI and restrictions to economic 
globalization (all the variables correspond to KOF economic sub-indexes for which 
higher values represent more globalization). 
 
3.2. Analysis of results 
As we have just referred, we started by estimating a baseline model by including as a 
regressor one composite variable capturing globalization, the KOF globalization index. 
In order to be able to get potential different effects for the two groups of countries 
uncovered in section 2, wherein Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain constitute the IIPS, 
and are characterized by larger inequalities on average, and the other countries (non-
IIPS countries), we estimate the effects of globalization on inequality. Running this 
model in Eviews with cross-section fixed effects (and excluding Luxembourg from our 
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sample countries, for the reasons already explained), we obtain the results for each 
inequality measure shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Base model estimation results 
 Dependent variable 
 
Gini income 
coefficient 
S80/S20 ratio Risk of poverty 
(Real GDP per capita t-1)/1000 *1.066331 
(2.883580) 
*0.388936 
(3.692073) 
*1.037171 
(3.272622) 
(Real GDP per capita t-1)/1000 squared  *-0.015028 
(-2.722153) 
*-0.005773 
(-3.622312) 
*-0.016553 
(-3.427675) 
Unemployment rate t-1 **0.166047 
(2.145770) 
**0.055037 
(2.497952) 
***0.098199 
(1.679094) 
KOF t * IIPS **-0.184570 
(-2.227186) 
*-0.078534 
(-3.455787) 
***-0.149502 
(-1.828959) 
KOF t * non-IIPS 0.157438 
(1.480701) 
0.011860 
(0.513840) 
-0.113008 
(-1.245902) 
(Total taxes t-1 – taxes on consumption 
t-1 ) / total taxes t-1 
0.490856 
(0.044450) 
2.699099 
(0.988372) 
**-15.15969 
(-2.062531) 
Social protection benefits t 0.103241 
(1.102027) 
0.033190 
(1.537693) 
-0.056451 
(-1.105089) 
Lower education t ***0.085269 
(1.929632) 
0.015566 
(1.343274) 
-0.031606 
(-0.908128) 
Lagged dependent *0.562841 
(7.149558) 
*0.622805 
(7.626753) 
*0.644273 
(7.846440) 
No. Countries 10 10 10 
No. Observations 129 132 132 
Adjusted R Squared 0.915514 0.947116 0.954253 
F-Statistic 78.05848 131.3411 152.8089 
Prob.(F-Statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Notes: 1. Significant at 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***); t-statistics in parenthesis. 
2. Estimations made under white-diagonal standard error correction for valid statistic inference. 
 
Apart from lagged dependent variable we have chosen lagged values for some other 
variables in order to minimize estimation errors and to improve variables individual 
significance since, due to the specification with the lagged dependent variable, we 
cannot use the same variable in actual period/year and lagged one period/year. 
Hereupon, in Table 3 we note that all models show a very good fit, exhibiting an 
adjusted R-squared over 0.90, and a strong independent variables overall significance, 
with F-statistic p-values very close to zero. Regarding the individual variables 
significance, we find that real GDP per capita is significant at 1% level to explain 
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changes in Gini, S80/S20 income ratio and risk of poverty. Further, higher levels of real 
GDP contribute to increase inequality but just until a certain level, after which 
inequality tends to decrease. This Kuznets effect is visible on the positive sign of real 
GDP per capita (its growth implies an increase in inequality) and the negative of its 
square (after a certain level of real GDP per capita, its growth implies a decrease in 
inequality). Also its square is significant at 1% level for the three regressions. 
As expected, unemployment rate is also statistically significant in all models. Higher 
unemployment rates lead to higher income inequality and this outcome is robust across 
the three models. 
We estimate the impact of KOF index by groups of countries on inequality. For the 
richest countries of our sample (excluding Ireland), it seems that the KOF index does 
not exert influence on inequality. Instead, a larger KOF index in the poorest (Italy, 
Portugal and Spain) and Ireland seems to reduce inequality although it has no similar 
significance across inequality measures. For the S80/S20 income ratio the significance 
is at 1% level, and a higher value of KOF index helps to decrease inequality. This 
positive influence on equality is also perceived by its impact on the Gini coefficient, 
although at 5% level, and on risk of poverty, at 10% level. Therefore, our results are 
robust for the positive effects of globalization on reducing inequality for the countries 
belonging to the IIPS group. Otherwise, KOF is neutral in affecting inequality. Our 
results contradict the outcome of Dreher and Gaston (2008), who found that the 
globalization index increases OECD countries income inequality, at least at a 10% 
significance level. However, our outcome relates to a specific group of countries which 
belongs to OECD thirty-four group of countries. Dreher and Gaston (2008) outcome 
includes much more countries and countries from various continents which leads them 
to a different result, in general.  
Tax burden effects are not even across regressions. Devoting our attention to the weight 
on total taxes of direct taxes, that is, taxes on labor and taxes on capital, we find a 
negative significance merely on risk of poverty regression, at 10% (higher this ratio 
lower the percentage of people at risk of poverty). The reason why this happens may be 
related with the fact that taxes on labor are progressive and taxes on capital tax the 
capital owners, who are the richest. Thus, a higher percentage of these taxes on total 
taxes charged will imply higher contributions of the richest/higher paid, which allows to 
narrow income gaps between rich and poor and to bring down the national median 
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equivalised disposable income. This median income is used to determine the poverty 
threshold and, when it is lower, lower is threshold and more people will appear above it. 
The two other estimations do not confirm this result and they suggest this variable does 
not affect income inequality. 
Government transfers, that is, social protection benefits variable does not show any 
significant effect on inequality. As we have been verifying, IIPS countries exhibit 
higher structural inequality and, since we are using cross-section fixed effects, our 
model may be capturing these structural effects on inequality measures through these 
fixed effects. Moreover, taxes also tend to reflect, in symmetry, the evolution of 
transfers as both work as automatic stabilizers. Thus, our specification may render 
social protection benefits not significant. 
The variable lower education is also significant in one of the three baseline estimations. 
Its positive influence on Gini coefficient means that the greater number of people with 
lower secondary education attainment greater is income inequality. This may indicate 
that the low-skilled workers are located in works with low wages while the high-skilled 
ones are paid with higher wages. 
After this general model estimation, we estimate, following the same test of Dreher and 
Gaston (2008), a model in which KOF is unfolded into its three dimensions (see Table 
A.1 in Annex A). Estimation results are shown in Table 4 below: 
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Table 4: Estimation with each dimension of KOF index 
 Dependent variable 
 
Gini income 
coefficient 
S80/S20 ratio 
Risk of 
poverty 
(Real GDP per capita t-1)/1000 *1.310033 
(3.068958) 
*0.423553 
(3.979449) 
*1.374184 
(4.134985) 
(Real GDP per capita t-1)/1000 squared  *-0.018786 
(-2.991065) 
*-0.006235 
(-3.905078) 
*-0.021526 
(-4.251401) 
Unemployment rate t-1 **0.168335 
(2.120832) 
*0.065723 
(3.042812) 
***0.099993 
(1.673222) 
KOF_economic t * IIPS **-0.216332 
(-2.405802) 
**-0.050188 
(-2.357532) 
**-0.149869 
(-2.170669) 
KOF_economic t * non-IIPS -0.010716 
(-0.161151) 
0.000779 
(0.055732) 
-0.095251 
(-1.611625) 
KOF_social t * IIPS -0.028797 
(-0.488466) 
**-0.033406 
(-2.375672) 
-0.050606 
(-1.083746) 
KOF_social t * non-IIPS 0.092449 
(0.607068) 
-0.014814 
(-0.460176) 
***-0.174952 
(-1.751687) 
KOF_political t * IIPS 0.109621 
(0.825112) 
0.054468 
(1.604679) 
-0.024477 
(-0.280549) 
KOF_political t * non-IIPS ***0.184424 
(1.723489) 
**0.045646 
(2.413441) 
**0.173816 
(2.429651) 
(Total taxes t-1 – taxes on consumption t-
1 ) / total taxes t-1 
0.621680 
(0.045656) 
0.506993 
(0.170085) 
-12.75251 
(-1.416157) 
Social protection benefits t 0.034701 
(0.338030) 
0.023417 
(1.037694) 
***-0.103267 
(-1.717186) 
Lower education t **0.128790 
(2.514129) 
***0.023825 
(1.926813) 
-0.016110 
(-0.444151) 
Lagged dependent *0.530321 
(6.157635) 
*0.598167 
(6.829662) 
*0.548399 
(5.850211) 
No. Countries 10 10 10 
No. Observations 129 132 132 
Adjusted R Squared 0.917424 0.951131 0.957401 
F-Statistic 65.63991 116.8930 134.8267 
Prob.(F-Statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
    
    
Notes: 1. Significant at 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***); t-statistics in parenthesis. 
2. Estimations made under white-diagonal standard error correction for valid statistic inference. 
 
This decomposition of KOF index brings little changes to the significance of most 
variables. It corroborates the presence of Kuznets effect, with real GDP per capita and 
its square being statistically significant at 1%. Unemployment rate also appears to 
influence positively all inequality measures at least at 10% significance level. This was 
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the expected result and it confirms the inequality-unemployment trade-off referred by 
Hellier and Chusseau (2010). As regards taxation, results confirm the former ones for 
the Gini and the S80/S20 ratio while its significance in risk of poverty regression 
disappears and it strengthens the results across regressions. Social protection benefits 
show a negative impact only on risk of poverty at 10%. Still, redistributive policies 
remain not significant to explain disposable income inequality as measured by the Gini 
coefficient or the S80/S20 ratio. For lower education, the variable appears not only 
significant for Gini, as in previous estimations, but also for the S80/S20 income ratio 
regression, at 10%, which reinforces the importance of the education level to explain 
differences on disposable income inequality. 
For the three KOF sub-indices, we split the estimation of the parameters for IIPS and 
non-IIPS countries. It is now clear why a higher KOF index significantly explains 
smaller inequality for the IIPS countries. Its economic (significant for all inequality 
measures at 10%) and social (only significant at 10% for S80/S20) dimensions justify 
the behavior of the composite index, whereas the political dimension has no effect. In 
turn, results suggest that social globalization tends to decrease the percentage of people 
at risk of poverty (significant at 10%) while the political dimension is consistent and 
robust across measures in leading to increased inequality for the non-IIPS countries. 
However KOF index as a whole has no effect on inequality for this group of countries, 
as we have seen in the baseline model (Table 3); this may result because of the 
symmetric effects of social and political dimensions of globalization on inequality. 
We proceed with additional estimations (results shown in Table 5) in an attempt to 
understand whether the openness degree indicator of a country, as measured by the sum 
of its exports with its imports of goods and services in percentage of GDP, and its 
square have a weighty effect on any of our three inequality measures. This indicator is 
one of the components of the economic globalization sub-index of KOF and one of the 
most exhaustively used indicator in the literature to capture globalization. 
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Table 5: Estimation with openness degree explanatory variable 
 Dependent variable 
 Gini income coefficient S80/S20 ratio Risk of poverty 
 (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) 
(Real GDP per capita t-1)/1000 **0.828317 
(2.144304) 
**0.765735 
(2.032886) 
*0.331527 
(3.472619) 
*0.301542 
(3.118996) 
*0.932405 
(2.689094) 
**0.892773 
(2.416399) 
(Real GDP per capita t-1)/1000 
squared  
**-0.011329 
(-2.049006) 
***-0.010512 
(-1.927827) 
*-0.004745 
(-3.346762) 
*-0.004361 
(-3.043163) 
*-0.014552 
(-2.799607) 
**-0.014046 
(-2.564925) 
Unemployment rate t-1 ***0.162702 
(1.745615) 
0.151246 
(1.618771) 
*0.069430 
(3.138090) 
**0.061691 
(2.549517) 
0.102116 
(1.525356) 
0.092667 
(1.280879) 
Openness degree t * IIPS -0.016077 
(-0.477685) 
-0.025114 
(-0.353284) 
-0.001425 
(-0.200026) 
-0.027594 
(-1.424312) 
0.018502 
(1.445386) 
-0.000631 
(-0.010271) 
Openness degree t squared* IIPS  0.000029 
(0.123946) 
 0.000084 
(1.362178) 
 0.000061 
(0.337998) 
Openness degree t * non-IIPS 0.006315 
(0.274948) 
0.039110 
(0.846231) 
-0.001651 
(-0.359680) 
0.002652 
(0.265876) 
-0.004276 
(-0.291136) 
0.011518 
(0.294225) 
Openness degree t squared * non-
IIPS 
 -0.000144 
(-0.700004) 
 -0.000019 
(-0.487214) 
 -0.000069 
(-0.517840) 
KOF_social t * IIPS -0.059844 
(-1.039547) 
-0.058062 
(-0.962141) 
*-0.041723 
(-2.962593) 
**-0.036285 
(-2.591256) 
***-0.082898 
(-1.689746) 
-0.079983 
(-1.448910) 
KOF_social t * non-IIPS 0.075543 
(0.559494) 
0.073744 
(0.527660) 
-0.006640 
(-0.224103) 
-0.001216 
(-0.039960) 
***-0.186958 
(-1.891358) 
***-0.187166 
(-1.753157) 
KOF_political t * IIPS 0.112612 
(0.792141) 
0.112930 
(0.779089) 
0.053357 
(1.450616) 
***0.070288 
(1.910598) 
-0.041598 
(-0.472898) 
-0.031695 
(-0.328554) 
KOF_political t * non-IIPS 0.174747 
(1.614096) 
0.151075 
(1.288736) 
**0.046100 
(2.274211) 
***0.042000 
(1.935603) 
**0.169539 
(2.288071) 
**0.157926 
(2.019796) 
(Total taxes t-1 – taxes on 
consumption t-1 ) / total taxes t-1 
2.850187 
(0.194392) 
2.084557 
(0.136779) 
0.907551 
(0.285673) 
-0.044707 
(-0.013448) 
-13.96249 
(-1.409966) 
-14.86758 
(-1.537627) 
Social protection benefits t 0.059403 
(0.515731) 
0.064389 
(0.576570) 
0.026436 
(1.096006) 
0.022425 
(0.997592) 
-0.030051 
(-0.601957) 
-0.030580 
(-0.573310) 
Lower education t ***0.099125 
(1.876634) 
***0.093201 
(1.735839) 
0.017360 
(1.407589) 
0.015581 
(1.261973) 
-0.026700      
(-0.701943) 
-0.030628      
(-0.771089) 
Lagged dependent *0.561283 
(6.959894) 
*0.554209 
(6.747002) 
*0.639098 
(8.072325) 
*0.637042 
(8.149646) 
*0.644833 
(7.485950) 
*0.640080 
(7.271355) 
No. Countries 10 10 10 10 10 10 
No. Observations 129 129 132 132 132 132 
Adjusted R Squared 0.914312 0.913082 0.948848 0.949009 0.955656 0.954963 
F-Statistic 63.08168 57.02716 111.4541 102.5858 129.3252 116.7370 
Prob.(F-Statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Notes: 1. Significant at 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***); t-statistics in parenthesis. 
2. Estimations made under white-diagonal standard error correction for valid statistic inference. 
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Obviously, we do not include economic dimension of KOF index because one of its 
variables is openness degree, described as “Trade (percent of GDP)” in Table A.1 in 
Annex A. 
We include one regression (specification II) with the squared value of the openness 
degree, following Dobson and Ramlogan (2009) analysis. They found an openness 
Kuznets curve for the set of Latin American countries under study: an increase in the 
openness degree increases inequality but up until a certain level, after which inequality 
exhibits a downward trend. From the analysis of the results in Table 5 above, we can 
conclude that openness is not significant to explain neither income inequalities nor the 
share of people at risk of poverty in both groups of countries and, so, we do not find 
evidence for an openness Kuznets curve relative to inequality. 
In turn, and analyzing the model without openness degree squared (specification I), the 
Kuznets curve on income and the unemployment rate maintain their significance, 
although at different levels relative to the baseline model (although, unemployment 
renders not significant for risk of poverty) and lower education corroborates its positive 
significance at 10% level on Gini. 
Social KOF is again significant for the IIPS group, now at 1%, in the S80/S20 
regression. For risk of poverty, it is significant at 10% for both groups of countries, 
contributing to reduce inequality. Also KOF political confirms its positive influence on 
inequality of non-IIPS countries, despite it is not significant in explaining Gini. 
Tax structure is not significant as in Gini and S80/S20 baseline models and widens it to 
risk of poverty regression, while social protection benefits remain no significant across 
all regressions, what suggests, again, that our model may be capturing the structural 
effects on inequality measure through the fixed effects estimation. Over again, lower 
education appears positively significant at 10%, only for Gini. 
The results in Table 6 have as a main goal to assess the impact of FDI inflows on the 
three alternative inequality measures. We also opted to estimate one regression with the 
squared value for this variable to ascertain whether it has a certain level at which 
inequality changes its normal trend or, on the contrary, it is accentuated, as reported for 
trade openness.  
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Table 6: Estimation with FDI inflows 
 Dependent variable 
 Gini income coefficient S80/S20 ratio Risk of poverty 
 (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) 
(Real GDP per capita t-1)/1000 **0.862075 
(2.497755) 
**0.845921 
(2.452844) 
*0.316549 
(3.491101) 
*0.309636 
(3.354593) 
**0.819078 
(2.418667) 
**0.815951 
(2.326869) 
(Real GDP per capita t-1)/1000 
squared 
**-0.011895 
(-2.369827) 
**-0.011670 
(-2.321492) 
*-0.004547 
(-3.324893) 
*-0.004448 
(-3.185572) 
**-0.013054 
(-2.535296) 
**-0.013016 
(-2.446147) 
Unemployment rate t-1 **0.167184 
(2.063361) 
**0.166381 
(2.077612) 
*0.063516 
(2.982896) 
*0.061895 
(2.899389) 
0.074774 
(1.139174) 
0.074436 
(1.104681) 
FDI inflows t * IIPS -0.007235 
(-0.209488) 
-0.008673 
(-0.324444) 
0.002530 
(0.342850) 
-0.000823 
(-0.145982) 
0.006172 
(0.379916) 
0.005589 
(0.300852) 
FDI inflows t squared* IIPS  0.000108 
(0.051417) 
 0.000296 
(0.708355) 
 0.000031 
(0.033936) 
FDI inflows t * non-IIPS 0.024406 
(1.004055) 
0.009578 
(0.174120) 
0.005479 
(1.292090) 
0.008039 
(0.777017) 
**-0.032709 
(-2.407434) 
-0.040484 
(-1.254318) 
FDI inflows t squared * non-IIPS  0.000502 
(0.390326) 
 -0.000082 
(-0.317759) 
 0.000262 
(0.366725) 
KOF_social t * IIPS -0.081369 
(-1.540856) 
-0.078643 
(-1.476850) 
*-0.043825 
(-3.286001) 
*-0.043861 
(-3.228594) 
-0.057086 
(-1.244837) 
-0.056620 
(-1.216744) 
KOF_social t * non-IIPS 0.026471 
(0.194715) 
0.029843 
(0.214954) 
-0.023769 
(-0.798627) 
-0.021533 
(-0.717135) 
**-0.211578 
(-2.251286) 
**-0.211647 
(-2.169673) 
KOF_political t * IIPS 0.037583 
(0.267325) 
0.039438 
(0.277792) 
0.037239 
(0.987519) 
0.038130 
(0.999094) 
-0.049977 
(-0.574255) 
-0.049447 
(-0.563324) 
KOF_political t * non-IIPS 0.271135 
(1.602254) 
0.268275 
(1.561426) 
**0.061475 
(1.955856) 
***0.062129 
(1.934196) 
**0.216787 
(2.011487) 
**0.215741 
(1.986122) 
(Total taxes t-1 – taxes on 
consumption t-1 ) / total taxes t-1 
3.004737 
(0.217725) 
3.474179 
(0.246473) 
1.658883 
(0.570652) 
1.486147 
(0.493151) 
-7.438779 
(-0.877274) 
-7.243128 
(-0.832738) 
Social protection benefits t 0.085786 
(0.839680) 
0.080722 
(0.743622) 
0.033828 
(1.508266) 
0.036276 
(1.518112) 
-0.071725 
(-1.345126) 
-0.074182 
(-1.274950) 
Lower education t 0.076914 
(1.477671) 
0.076801 
(1.431021) 
0.014324 
(1.050579) 
0.015154 
(1.082052) 
-0.037345      
(-0.865917) 
-0.037592      
(-0.848320) 
Lagged dependent *0.567654 
(6.057416) 
*0.566223 
(6.001542) 
*0.652002 
(7.285459) 
*0.653745 
(7.280526) 
*0.632157 
(7.563139) 
*0.629239 
(7.501841) 
No. Countries 10 10 10 10 10 10 
No. Observations 115 115 118 118 118 118 
Adjusted R Squared 0.921654 0.919995 0.950373 0.949543 0.961294 0.960483 
F-Statistic 61.95799 55.62121 102.8441 92.74177 133.0809 119.4887 
Prob.(F-Statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Notes: 1. Significant at 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***); t-statistics in parenthesis. 
2. Estimations made under white-diagonal standard error correction for valid statistic inference.  
 
Analyzing Table 6, we conclude that FDI inflows have no robust effect on inequality. 
Unlike most studies in literature, we do not find a strong relationship between FDI 
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inflows and income inequality (merely significance, at 5% level, in the risk of poverty 
regression for non-IIPS countries). These regressions merely come to confirm the 
Kuznets effect, the importance of unemployment rate (although it is not, again, 
significant in the risk of poverty regression), as well as the results for social and political 
KOF, being that the latter are more robust, since KOF political contributes significantly 
to increase inequality in non-IIPS countries, at 5% level, for two out of three inequality 
measures (risk of poverty and S80/S20 ratio). 
Besides FDI inflows and openness degree, globalization measures mostly addressed in 
literature to affect inequality, also FDI outflows have been focus of attention as is the 
case the study of Alderson and Nielsen (2002). While they argue the shift of the labor of 
industrial sector to service sector, due to an increase in FDI outflows, has leading to an 
increased inequality, we do not find, in Table 7, any consistent result which validates 
this argument. 
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Table 7: Estimation with FDI outflows 
 Dependent variable 
 Gini income coefficient S80/S20 ratio Risk of poverty 
 (I) (II) (I) (II) (I) (II) 
(Real GDP per capita t-
1)/1000 
**0.970321 
(2.509882) 
**0.881787 
(2.241969) 
*0.342907 
(3.394694) 
*0.333640 
(3.122558) 
**0.805597 
(2.323125) 
**0.806141 
(2.208039) 
(Real GDP per capita t-
1)/1000 squared 
**-0.013868 
(-2.325639) 
**-0.012452 
(-2.047697) 
*-0.005026 
(-3.210578) 
*-0.004842 
(-2.920401) 
**-0.012959 
(-2.424764) 
**-0.012950 
(-2.298204) 
Unemployment rate t-1 **0.187559 
(2.075121) 
**0.200661 
(2.208297) 
*0.067086 
(2.853119) 
*0.069808 
(2.966232) 
0.079696 
(1.159175) 
0.079227 
(1.138180) 
FDI outflows t * IIPS -0.090630 
(-1.036729) 
**-0.333989 
(-2.162884) 
-0.012715 
(-0.534496) 
-0.064843 
(-1.256978) 
-0.004586 
(-0.086684) 
-0.019220 
(-0.174570) 
FDI outflows t squared* 
IIPS 
 ***-0.024787 
(-1.969563) 
 -0.005577 
(-1.350901) 
 -0.001634 
(-0.150507) 
FDI outflows t * non-IIPS -0.027668 
(-1.630181) 
-0.021218 
(-0.412814) 
***-0.005558 
(-1.893559) 
-0.008807 
(-0.907233) 
**0.020261 
(2.448725) 
0.014309 
(0.541034) 
FDI outflows t squared * 
non-IIPS 
 0.000153 
(0.138763) 
 -0.000092 
(-0.421193) 
 -0.000163 
(-0.288937) 
KOF_social t * IIPS ***-0.092212 
(-1.754326) 
-0.070319 
(-1.516629) 
*-0.045623 
(-3.285596) 
*-0.043881 
(-3.204236) 
-0.054978 
(-1.211609) 
-0.054700 
(-1.116184) 
KOF_social t * non-IIPS -0.000299 
(-0.002145) 
0.010927 
(0.076054) 
-0.028873 
(-0.952251) 
-0.031063 
(-1.008785) 
**-0.185285 
(-2.037079) 
**-0.188497 
(-2.013419) 
KOF_political t * IIPS -0.030025 
(-0.194325) 
-0.039266 
(-0.257760) 
0.027498 
(0.670603) 
0.026607 
(0.637805) 
-0.038874 
(-0.411124) 
-0.039721 
(-0.414335) 
KOF_political t * non-IIPS ***0.283962 
(1.690679) 
***0.296491 
(1.666846) 
**0.064482 
(2.160452) 
**0.069652 
(2.209050) 
***0.191346 
(1.803886) 
***0.194476 
(1.811336) 
(Total taxes t-1 – taxes on 
consumption t-1 ) / total 
taxes t-1 
7.740722 
(0.584840) 
10.79871 
(0.841152) 
2.096370 
(0.757704) 
2.297475 
(0.873864) 
-8.196261 
(-0.897024) 
-8.244308 
(-0.856641) 
Social protection benefits t 0.095596 
(1.002832) 
0.111310 
(1.141683) 
0.035996 
(1.599297) 
***0.043686 
(1.806622) 
-0.069134 
(-1.279603) 
-0.064768 
(-1.146055) 
Lower education t 0.067847 
(1.275497) 
0.068714 
(1.236447) 
0.012727 
(0.883823) 
0.014056 
(0.938032) 
-0.038602      
(-0.900103) 
-0.037652      
(-0.859424) 
Lagged dependent *0.581993 
(6.715908) 
*0.564835 
(6.219066) 
*0.648390 
(7.359356) 
*0.085109 
(7.239301) 
*0.648210 
(7.740196) 
*0.648256 
(7.625247) 
No. Countries 10 10 10 10 10 10 
No. Observations 115 115 118 118 118 118 
Adjusted R Squared 0.923470 0.924192 0.950825 0.951384 0.960599 0.959775 
F-Statistic 63.52807 58.90802 103.8292 96.39986 130.6590 117.3170 
Prob.(F-Statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Notes: 1. Significant at 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***); t-statistics in parenthesis. 
2. Estimations made under white-diagonal standard error correction for valid statistic inference.  
 
On the contrary, we only obtain a strong negative impact of FDI outflows on Gini 
coefficient, when they are estimated jointly with its square for IIPS countries. When 
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they are estimated without their square, FDI outflows appear contradictory significant 
for S80/S20 ratio (negatively) and risk of poverty (positively), at 10% and 5% 
respectively, for non-IIPS countries. In short, we can conclude for a positive influence 
of FDI outflows on income equality if country belongs to IIPS when inequality is 
measured by Gini coefficient, while they do not exert a significant influence neither on 
S80/S20 ratio nor on share of people at risk of poverty. An argument can be that when 
the developed countries move capital abroad they get more investment opportunities 
and they may share the additional gains with workers, thus contributing to wage 
convergence. In turn, social KOF, following the results from the model with the three 
KOF sub-indices, confirms its negative effect in IIPS countries inequality, when we 
estimate its impact on Gini and S80/S20 ratio, and in non-IIPS countries, in the case of 
the risk of poverty regression. With regard to these regressions, there is nothing more of 
weight to add, except the confirmation, again, of the Kuznets effect as well as the 
significance of unemployment rate to increase inequality (except for risk of poverty 
regression), and the fading of lower education significance for any inequality measure. 
Since we have already seen the main economic globalization aspects - openness and 
FDI (not only inflows but also outflows) -, we now turn our attention to the role of 
restrictions on trade and capital flows. Given that economic KOF index encompasses a 
sub-index Restrictions, which consists in hidden import barriers, mean tariff rate, taxes 
on international trade (percent of current revenue) and capital account restrictions (see 
Table A.1 in Annex A), we use these available data to assess the real importance of 
these restrictions, in an Europe more and more integrated and without barriers amongst 
itself. In this sense, the deeper globalization is, the lower are these restrictions and the 
higher is the value of our variable. Precisely because of this integration and the 
existence of an economic world more and more competitive, these economic restrictions 
tend to fall and even to disappear, whereby we do not need, nor it is justified, to 
estimate them with its square, like we have done with openness degree and FDI. 
Estimation results for our three inequality measures are exhibited in Table 8. 
The main outcomes that corroborate some results we have been getting are the evidence 
of the Kuznets curve for all inequality measures, by real GDP and its square coefficients 
and the significance of the unemployment rate and lower education for Gini and 
S80/S20 ratio regressions, what shows the distinction, in terms of wages, between high 
and low-skilled workers. 
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Table 8: Estimation with restrictions to economic globalization 
 Dependent variable 
 
Gini income 
coefficient 
S80/S20 ratio 
Risk of 
poverty 
(Real GDP per capita t-1)/1000 **0.983572 
(2.350031) 
*0.379692 
(3.756724) 
**0.884548 
(2.416045) 
(Real GDP per capita t-1)/1000 squared  **-0.013157 
(-2.194527) 
*-0.005394 
(-3.616855) 
**-0.014084 
(-2.611882) 
Unemployment rate t-1 **0.188701 
(2.229331) 
*0.074279 
(3.529114) 
0.080724 
(1.095988) 
Economic restrictions t * IIPS **-0.113740 
(-2.311556) 
-0.012731 
(-1.134758) 
-0.011889 
(-0.281807) 
Economic restrictions t * non-IIPS -0.018680 
(-0.359960) 
0.011980 
(1.111276) 
-0.035457 
(-0.882413) 
KOF_social t * IIPS -0.069463 
(-1.236445) 
*-0.047339 
(-3.387642) 
-0.070159 
(-1.358269) 
KOF_social t * non-IIPS 0.088730 
(0.690814) 
-0.010974 
(-0.399536) 
**-0.232795 
(-2.398552) 
KOF_political t * IIPS -0.022787 
(-0.155040) 
0.030828 
(0.853321) 
-0.021189 
(-0.217680) 
KOF_political t * non-IIPS 0.174248 
(1.624188) 
**0.050843 
(2.570333) 
**0.150652 
(2.192544) 
(Total taxes t-1 – taxes on consumption t-
1 ) / total taxes t-1 
1.420252 
(0.099084) 
0.170087 
(0.053856) 
-13.15204 
(-1.353261) 
Social protection benefits t 0.039926 
(0.362700) 
0.034031 
(1.407608) 
-0.060436 
(-1.023974) 
Lower education t **0.132116 
(2.608271) 
***0.019453 
(1.688043) 
-0.027574 
(-0.747915) 
Lagged dependent *0.519057 
(5.649138) 
*0.652523 
(7.522453) 
*0.588561 
(5.994911) 
No. Countries 10 10 10 
No. Observations 129 132 132 
Adjusted R Squared 0.916831 0.950008 0.955534 
F-Statistic 65.13789 114.1555 128.9564 
Prob.(F-Statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Notes: 1. Significant at 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***); t-statistics in parenthesis. 
2. Estimations made under white-diagonal standard error correction for valid statistic inference.  
 
These regressions confirm, also, the outcomes of the second model (with the three KOF 
sub-indices) in which social KOF is negatively significant for IIPS countries, when we 
estimate its impact on S80/S20 ratio, and for non-IIPS countries, when we estimate its 
impact on risk of poverty. Moreover, political KOF is again significant for non-IIPS 
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countries at 5%, in S80/S20 and risk of poverty regressions, but its relevance disappears 
on Gini estimation albeit its p-value is very close to 10% (0.1073). 
By its turn, the restrictions to economic globalization only appear statistically 
significant for IIPS countries when we estimate their influence on Gini, and with the 
expected sign as lower restrictions reduce inequality.
7
 That is, these countries, being 
economically structurally impaired, could benefit from less trade barriers to promote 
and develop their domestic economy and to become internationally more competitive. 
Thus, the positive impact on reducing inequality of the economic dimension of KOF for 
the IIPS-countries (visible in the second model) is explained by FDI outflows and 
restrictions, since the openness degree and FDI inflows are not significant in any 
regression for this group of countries. On the other hand, economic restrictions have no 
effect on non-IIPS countries and, from the various models we observed, the null impact 
of the economic dimension on inequality for the non-IIPS countries results from the 
empty impact of each variable we use as its proxy. 
  
                                               
7
 As already referred in this section, a larger value for the index Economic Restrictions corresponds to 
higher globalization.  
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4. Conclusions  
The main goal of this study was to assess the main mechanisms through which stronger 
integration and globalization, as conventionally measured through international trade 
and investment flows depth, may impinge on within-country income inequality 
distribution. For that, we proceeded with a review of the literature on the theoretical 
mechanisms through which globalization transmits to income inequality and on the 
main results for their empirical validation, applied to regions of different development 
levels and for different time span. We have found that there are unclear and opposite 
conclusions. Different estimation methods or even criteria in the definition of variables, 
in the sense of more rigorous or composite definitions of globalization, are possible 
aspects to explain some of those opposite results. 
We then pursued with an empirical analysis to assess the impact of globalization 
variables on income inequality. For robustness purposes, and differently from most of 
the studies, we included alternative measures of disposable income inequality - the Gini 
coefficient, S80/S20 income ratio and the percentage of people at risk of poverty. 
Moreover, the study is conducted for a sample of developed countries, using an 
unbalanced panel data model with fixed effects for ten Euro area countries covering for 
the period 1995-2011. The group of countries includes Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain 
(IIPS) and a set of higher-income countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, the 
Netherlands and Germany). 
Our main results point to a negative impact of globalization (as measured by the 
composite KOF index developed by Dreher, 2006) on inequality if the country belongs 
to IIPS. Moreover, this result is robust across inequality measures and appears to be 
strongly dependent on the economic dimension of globalization. In turn, the significant 
effect of the economic dimension of KOF in reducing inequality can be justified by FDI 
outflows and by the relaxation of economic restrictions to international trade and capital 
flows. However, we find this evidence only for the case of the Gini coefficient. Albeit 
in contrast to the literature, the outcome for FDI outflows can be explained since that in 
more developed countries there is an increase in investment opportunities and the 
additional gains may be shared with workers, thus contributing to wage convergence. 
The negative influence of restrictions on IIPS countries Gini coefficient seems to 
suggest that these countries, being economically structurally impaired, could benefit 
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from less trade barriers. Relatively to openness degree and FDI we did not find any 
relationship with inequality, in both groups of countries. 
As regards the social dimension of globalization as recorded in the KOF index, we 
found a robust result whereby it reduces inequality as measured by the S80/S20 and the 
risk of poverty, if the country is an IIPS and a non-IIPS, respectively. This outcome is in 
line with result of Zhou et al. (2011), whose estimates point to a negative influence of 
higher levels of travel and tourism and internet users on inequality. A more robust result 
is the positive impact of the political KOF on non-IIPS countries inequality. This may 
be related with the concentration of power in large economic groups and its favoring. 
Additionally, we also found a robust Kuznets effect of real GDP on inequality, that is, 
inequality rises with real GDP per capita until a certain level is reached, after which 
inequality starts do decrease. We can also confirm the negative effects of 
unemployment on income inequality, although not significant in all regressions to 
explain increases in the percentage of people at risk of poverty. In what concern the 
other control variables, tax structure, social protection benefits and education, we only 
find stronger evidence for education in reducing inequality; lower education is 
statistically significant in most of the regressions.  
According to our results, reduction in inequality in IIPS could be fostered by a further 
relaxation of economic restrictions to international trade, such as import or export duties 
or tariff rates, for example. Moreover, they should promote outward investment. 
Apparently, economic globalization forces firms to become more competitive, with 
positive effects on income distribution. In turn, the political dimension of globalization 
seems to contribute to increased inequality in non-IIPS. We argue that the concentration 
of power in large economic groups and its favoring is increasing inequality in non-IIPS 
countries. Stronger unionization and union power as well as small governments could 
be two ways to solve this setback. 
However, we can identify several drawbacks to the validation, acceptance and 
interpretation of our results. One relates to the fact that we use the lagged dependent 
variable as regressor and we followed the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation 
method. Hereupon, the option for the generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimation method could be more adequate to control for consistent estimation, a 
substantially more complex and time-consuming method. Another limitation concerns 
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data availability. For our set of globalization and control variables, we found some 
constraints to define our sample period because some of them were available only for 
more recent time periods. Moreover, and as we can see in the note in Annex D, there are 
several variables for which we could not to collect data for all years of our sample 
period: FDI inflows and outflows, for instance, exhibit considerable breaks in time 
series. 
Nevertheless, our study contributes to the literature with a particular analysis of the 
effects of globalization in inequality for developed countries, namely the Euro area 
countries. Moreover, we further assess the relevance of different dimensions of 
globalization (economic, social and political), and also of the several economic-related 
globalization variables (openness, restrictions and FDI), to explain inequality dynamics. 
Furthermore, we also split the analysis into two groups of developed countries, finding 
relevant differences between them. Future research is in need to find how and which 
different mechanisms can operate from (different forms) globalization to income 
inequality in more or less developed countries or in countries with rather different social 
protection schemes and education endowments.  
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Annexes 
Annex A – Globalization indexes composition 
Table A.1: 2013 KOF Index of Globalization 
  
Source: Dreher, A. (2006). 
Updated in: Dreher et al. (2008). 
Indices and Variables Weights
A. Economic Globalization [36%]
i) Actual Flows (50%)
Trade (percent of GDP) (21%)
Foreign Direct Investment, stocks (percent of GDP) (28%)
Portfolio Investment (percent of GDP) (24%)
Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (percent of GDP) (27%)
ii) Restrictions (50%)
Hidden Import Barriers (24%)
Mean Tariff Rate (27%)
Taxes on International Trade (percent of current revenue) (26%)
Capital Account Restrictions (23%)
B. Social Globalization [37%]
i) Data on Personal Contact (34%)
Telephone Traffic (25%)
Transfers (percent of GDP) (3%)
International Tourism (26%)
Foreign Population (percent of total population) (21%)
International letters (per capita) (24%)
ii) Data on Information Flows (35%)
Internet Users (per 1000 people) (33%)
Television (per 1000 people) (36%)
Trade in Newspapers (percent of GDP) (31%)
iii) Data on Cultural Proximity (31%)
Number of McDonald's Restaurants (per capita) (45%)
Number of Ikea (per capita) (45%)
Trade in books (percent of GDP) (10%)
C. Political Globalization [26%]
Embassies in Country (25%)
Membership in International Organizations (28%)
Participation in U.N. Security Council Missions (22%)
International Treaties (26%)
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Table A.2: Composition of the EFW Index 
 
Source: Gwartney et al. (2012). 
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Table A.3: Composition of MGI 
Maastricht Globalization Index (MGI) variables 
Category 
Variable 
name 
Variable definition 
 
Political Domain Embassies Absolute number of in-country embassies and high commissions 
 
Organizations Absolute number of memberships in international organizations 
 
Military Trade in conventional arms as a share of military spending 
Economic domain Trade Imports + exports of goods and services as a share of GDP 
 
FDI Gross foreign direct stocks as a share of GDP 
 
Capital Gross private capital flows as a share of GDP 
Social & Cultural 
Domain 
Migrants 
Those who changes their country of usual residence per 100 
inhabitant 
 
Tourism International arrivals + departures per 100 inhabitants 
Technological Domain Phone 
Incoming + outgoing international telephone traffic in minutes per 
capita 
 
Internet Internet users as a share of population 
Ecological Domain Eco footprint Ecological deficit in global ha 
 
Martens et al. Globalization and Health 2010 6:16 doi:10.1186/1744-8603-6-16 
Source: http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/6/1/16/table/T2, accessed in 
March 2013. 
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Table A.4: Composition of KGI (Kearney Globalization Index) 
 
Source: Lockwood (2001).  
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Annex B – FDI outflows, average values 1995-2011 
Figure B.1: FDI outflows and Gini coefficient, average values 1995-2011 
 
* 
Figure B.2: FDI outflows and S80/S20 income quintile ratio, average values 1995-
2011 
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Figure B.3: FDI outflows and the percentage of population at risk of poverty, 
average values, 1995-2011 
 
* Data Source: Own calculation based on data from Eurostat, accessed in February 2013 at    
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes. 
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Annex C – KOF index, average values 1995-2010 
Figure C.1: KOF index and Gini coefficient, average values 1995-2010 
 
* 
Figure C.2: KOF index and S80/S20 income quintile ratio, average values 1995-
2010 
 
* 
  
Belgium 
Germany 
Spain 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Ireland 
22 
24 
26 
28 
30 
32 
34 
36 
38 
75 80 85 90 95 
G
in
i 
co
ef
fi
ci
en
t 
KOF index of globalization 
Country 
Trend 
Belgium 
Germany 
Spain 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Ireland 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
75 80 85 90 95 
S
8
0
/S
2
0
 i
n
co
m
e 
sh
a
re
 r
a
ti
o
 
KOF index of globalization 
Country 
Trend 
 58 
Figure C.3: KOF index and the percentage of population at risk of poverty, 
average values 1995-2010 
 
* Data Source: Own calculation based on data from http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/ for KOF 
index of globalization, accessed in May 2013, and from 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes for other 
variables, accessed in February 2013.  
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Annex D - General descriptive statistics 
 
Average 
across 
countries 
Std. Dev. 
across 
countries 
Max Min Obs. 
First 
year of 
data 
Last 
year of 
data 
Gini coefficient on income 29.25 3.63 38.10 22.00 157 1995 2011 
S80/S20 ratio 4.63 1.03 7.40 3.00 159 1995 2011 
People at risk of poverty  15.33 3.61 23.00 8.00 159 1995 2011 
Openness degree 90.53 40.48 187.80 44.50 170 1995 2011 
FDI – inflows 4.39 6.46 38.20 -15.60 153 1995 2011 
FDI – outflows -4.98 5.60 3.30 -43.60 153 1995 2011 
Restrictions to econ. glob. 89.76 4.35 98.51 79.09 160 1995 2010 
Kof overall 85.03 4.68 92.72 73.84 160 1995 2010 
Kof economic 82.85 8.57 96.83 62.72 160 1995 2010 
Kof social 81.41 6.01 91.25 65.64 160 1995 2010 
Kof political 93.21 3.56 98.43 82.49 160 1995 2010 
Real gdp per capita 26,003.53 6,043.23 41,500.00 12,000.00 170 1995 2011 
Unemployment rate 8.29 3.51 21.70 2.50 170 1995 2011 
Lower education 46.15 17.68 85.40 18.30 167 1995 2011 
Social protection benefits 24.95 4.23 32.04 13.14 160 1995 2010 
Direct taxes / total taxes 0.71 0.05 0.77 0.59 160 1995 2010 
 Note: Several variables exhibit breaks in time series, namely: 
- Gini coefficient, S80/S20 ratio and people at risk of poverty: 2002 for Austria and Belgium; 
1995 for Finland; 2002-2004 for Germany; 2002 and 2011 for Ireland; 2002-2003 for Italy; 
2004 for the Netherlands; 2002-2003 for Portugal (but S80/S20). 
- FDI – inflows and FDI – outflows: 1995-2001 for Belgium; 1998-2003 for France; 1995-1998 
for Germany. 
- Lower education: 1998 for Germany and Ireland; 1995 for the Netherlands. 
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Annex E – Correlations between explanatory variables  
Table E.1: Correlations matrix 
 OPENNESS FDI_IN FDI_OUT RESTRICTIONS KOF KOF_ECON KOF_SOCIAL KOF_POLITICAL 
         
         
OPENNESS  1.000000 0.521332 -0.488474 0.230128 0.711609 0.862149 0.387679 -0.277664 
FDI_IN   1.000000 -0.680033 0.170168 0.459494 0.445744 0.305741 0.046819 
FDI_OUT    1.000000 -0.153401 -0.528028 -0.466472 -0.390966 -0.101962 
RESTRICTIONS     1.000000 0.208760 0.431248 0.004104 -0.389572 
KOF      1.000000 0.795406 0.844431 0.211079 
KOF_ECON       1.000000 0.379193 -0.287642 
KOF_SOCIAL        1.000000 0.395642 
KOF_POLITICAL         1.000000 
REALGDP         
LOWER EDUCATION         
SOCIAL PROTECT BENEF         
DIRECT/TOTAL_TAXES         
UNEMPLOYMENT         
          
Table E.2: Correlations matrix (cont.) 
 
 REALGDP LOWER EDUCATION SOCIAL PROTEC BENEF DIRECT/TOTAL_TAXES UNEMPLOYMENT 
          
          
OPENNESS 0.689227 -0.383462 -0.176477 -0.304824 -0.446913 
FDI_IN 0.245798 -0.141106 -0.079034 -0.009306 -0.150933 
FDI_OUT -0.348713 0.227469 -0.007672 -0.070394 0.226518 
RESTRICTIONS 0.145583 -0.159401 -0.129591 -0.153594 -0.209675 
KOF 0.579890 -0.484267 0.216429 0.029520 -0.446660 
KOF_ECON 0.541734 -0.252862 -0.255285 -0.369938 -0.470798 
KOF_SOCIAL 0.457721 -0.595532 0.533709 0.287820 -0.235290 
KOF_POLITICAL -0.063756 -0.047978 0.547216 0.629455 -0.085140 
REALGDP  1.000000 -0.783286 0.216453 0.135228 -0.439963 
LOWER_EDUCATION   1.000000 -0.595858 -0.332629 0.327631 
SOCIAL PROTECT BENEF    1.000000 0.584671 -0.022275 
DIRECT/TOTAL_TAXES    1.000000 0.213365 
UNEMPLOYMENT      1.000000 
 
